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Abstract-The signs and symptoms of disease do something more than signify the functioning of our 
bodies: they also signify critically sensitive and contradictory components of our culture and social 
relations. Yet, in our standard medical practices this social “language” emanating from our bodies is 
manipulated by concealing it within the realm of biological signs. I try to show this by means of a 
patient’s interpretation of the meaning of her illness. This case study illustrates that in denying the 
human relations embodied in signs, symptoms, and therapy. we mystiiy those relations and also repro- 
duce a political ideologv in the guise of a science of physical things. This I call reificarion, following Karl 
Marx’s’analysis of the&mmodzy and Georg Luk&s’ gpplication of this analysis-to the interpretaiion of 
capitalist culture and its mode of objectifying social relations. I argue that in sustaining reification, our 
medical practice invigorates cultural axioms as well as modulating the contradictions intrinsic to our 
culture and views of objectivity. In this way disease is recruited into serving the ideological needs of the 
social order, to the detriment of healing and our understanding of the social causes of misfortune. 
THE MARXIn PROBLEM: RElFlCATlON 
By means of a cultural analysis of an illness and its 
treatment in the USA in 1978, I wish to direct atten- 
tion to the importance of two problems raised by 
Marxism and by anthropology concerning the moral 
and social significance of biological and physical 
“things”. I am going to argue that things such as the 
signs and symptoms of disease, as much as the tech- 
nology of healing, are not “things-in-themselves”, are 
not only biological and physical, but are also signs of 
social relations disguised as natural things, concealing 
their roots in human reciprocity. 
The problem raised by Marxism comes from the 
famous essay of Georg LukLs published in 1922 en- 
titled “Reification and the Consciouness of the Prole- 
tariat”, an essay which had explosive impact on the 
European Communist movement, in good part due to 
its critique of “historical materialism” as developed by 
Engels, Lenin, and the theoreticians of the German 
Social Democrat Party. In essence, Luklcs charged 
that the concept of objectivity held by capitalist cul- 
ture was an illusion fostered by capitalist relations of 
production and that this concept of objectivity had 
been thoughtlessly assimilated by Marxist critics who 
were, therefore, upholding basic categories of the 
social form they thought they were impugning. 
Lukics attempted to construct a critical sociology of 
bourgeois knowledge which assailed the very theory 
of knowledge or epistemology which he felt was basic 
to capitalist culture. The Kantian and neo-Kantian 
antinomies between “fact” and “value”, as much as 
the empiricist copy-book theory of knowledge sharply 
dividing “objectivity” from “subjectivity”, were, in 
LukPcs opinion, tools of thought which reproduced 
capitalist ideology (even if they were deployed within 
a so-called “historical materialist” framework of 
analysis). The roots of the thought-form which took 
the capitalist categories of reality for granted were to 
be found, he argued, in what he called the “com- 
modity-structure”, and a chief aim of his essay was to 
draw attention to the central importance of the analy- 
sis of commodities in Marx’ portrayal and critique of 
capitalism. There was no problem in this stage of his- 
tory, claimed LukBcs, that did not lead back to the 
question of the commodity structure, the central, 
structural problem of capitalist society in all its 
aspects. Intrinsic to this problem lay the phenomenon 
of reification-the thingification of the world, persons, 
and experience, as all of these are organized and 
reconstituted by market exchange and commodity 
production. The basis of commodity-structure, wrote 
Luklcs, “is that a relation between people takes on 
the character of a thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom 
objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly 
rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace 
of its fundamental nature: the relation between 
people” [ 11. 
It is with the phantom-objectivity of disease and its 
treatment in our society that I am concerned, because 
by denying the human relations embodied in symp 
toms, signs, and therapy, we not only mystify them 
but we also reproduce a political ideology in the guise 
of a science of (apparently) “real things”-biological 
and physical thinghood. In this way our objectivity as 
presented in medicine represents basic cultural 
axioms and modulates the contradictions inherent to 
our culture and view of objectivity. Rather than 
expound further, I now wish to exemplify these all too 
abstract orienting premises by means of a concrete 
ethnographic analysis of a sickness. But before doing 
so, I have to draw attention to a problem raised by 
anthropology, namely by Evans-Pritchard’s classic 
analysis of Azande witchcraft published in 1937 [2]. 
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEM: THE 
BIOLOGICAL BODY AND THE SOCIAL 
BODY 
It is surely a truism that the sense of self and of the 
body change over time and vary between different 
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cultures. in modern capitalist culture the body 
acquires a dualistic phenomenoiogy as both a thing 
and my being, body and “soul”. Witness Sartre’s 
chapters on the body in Being and Nothingness [3], 
Of course the physicians who have taken care of me, the 
surgeons who have operated on me, have been able to have 
direct experience with the body which I myself do not 
know. I do not disagree with them. I do not claim that I 
lack a brain, a heart, or a stomach. But it is most impor- 
tant to choose the order of our bits of knowledge. So far as 
the physicians have had any experience with my body, it 
was with my body in the midst of the world and as it is for 
others. My body as it is for me does not appear to me in 
the midst of the world. Of course during a radioscopy I 
was able to see the picture of my vertebrae on a screen, but 
I was outside in the midst of the world. I was apprehending 
a wholly constituted object as a this amongst other thises, 
and it was only a reasoning process that I referred it back 
to being mine; it was much more my property than my 
being. 
As it oscillates between being my property and my. 
being, ‘especially when diseased, my body asks me 
questions which the physician never ask or answer: 
“Why me?“, “Why now?” As Evans-Pritchard 
observed, these are the questions foremost in the 
Azande at~ibution of serious sickness or misfortune 
to witchcraft or sorcery-Le. to the malevolent dispo- 
sition of critically relevant social relationships. 
Science, as we understand it in our day and age, can- 
not explain the human significance of physical effects. 
To cite the common phraseology, science, like medi- 
cal science, can explain the “how” but not the “why” 
of disease: it can point to chains of physical cause and 
effect, but as to why I am struck down now rather 
than at some other time, or as to why it is me rather 
than someone else, medical science can only respond 
with some variety of probability theory which is un- 
satisfactory to the mind searching for certainty and 
for significance. In Azande practice, the issues of 
-‘how” and “why” are folded into one another; aetio- 
logy is simuit~eously physical, social, and moral. 
The cause of my physically obvious distress is to be 
located in my nexus of social relations involving 
someone else’s unjustly called for malevolence. This 
property of my social nexus expresses itself in physical 
symptoms and signs. My disease is a social relation, 
and therapy has to address that synthesis of moral, 
social, and physical presentation. 
There are two problems raised by this account. 
First, do patients in our society also ask themselves 
the questions that Azande do, despite the disenchant- 
ment of our age and its incredulity regarding witch- 
craft and sorcery’? Second, have we not falsified 
Azande epistemology, following Evans-Pritchard, in 
distinguishing the “how” from the “why”, “fact” from 
“value”, and immediate from ultimate causes? Unless 
we firmly grasp at the outset that these are not the 
salient native distinctions but that they are ours 
which we necessarily deploy in order to make some 
sense out of a foreign epistemology, we will fail to 
appreciate what is at issue. The salient distinction to 
note is that in Azande epistemology there is a vastly 
different conception of facts and things. Facts are not 
separated from values, physical manifestations are not 
torn from their sociai contexts, and it requires there- 
fore no great effort of mind to read social relations 
into material events. It is a specifically modern prob- 
lem wherein things like my bodily organs are at one 
instant mere things, and at *another instant question 
me insistently with all too human a voice regarding 
the social significance of their dis-ease. 
Paul Radin in his discussion of the concept of the 
self in “primitive” societies makes the same point. He 
suggests that the objective form of the ego in such 
societies is generally only intelligible in terms of the 
external world and other egos. Instead of the ego as a 
thing-in-~t~lf, it is seen as indissoIubly integrated with 
other persons and with nature. “A purely mechanistic 
conception of life,” he concludes, “is impossible. The 
parts of the body, the physiological functions of the 
organs, like the material objects taken by objects in 
nature, are mere symbols, simulacra, for the essential 
psychical-spiritual entity that lies behind them” [4]. 
As it oscillates between being a thing and my being, 
as it undergoes and yet disengages itself from reifica- 
tion, my body responds with a language that is as 
commonplace as it is startling. For the body is not 
only this organic mosaic of biological entities. It is 
also a cornucopia of highly charged symbols-fluids. 
scents, tissues, different surfaces. movements, feelings. 
cycles of changes constituting birth, growing old, 
sleeping and waking. Above ail, it is with disease with 
its terrifying phantoms of despair and hope that my 
body becomes ripe as little else for encoding that 
which society holds to be real-onty to impugn that 
reality. And if the body becomes this important 
repository for generating social meaning, then it is in 
therapy that we find the finely gauged tuning whereby 
the ratification of socially engendered categories and 
the fabulation of reality reaches its acme. 
In any society, the relationship between doctor and 
patient is more than a technical one. It is very much a 
social interaction which can reinforce the culture’s 
basic premises in a most powerful manner. The sick 
person is a dependent and anxious person, malleable 
in the hands of the doctor and the heaith system, and 
open to their m~ipulatjon and moralism. The sick 
person is one who is plunged into a vortex of the 
most fundamental questions concerning life and 
death. The everyday routine of more or less uncritical 
acceptance of the meaning of life is sharply inter- 
rupted by serious illness which has its own pointed 
way of turning all of us into metaphysicians and phi- 
losophers, (not to mention critics of a society which 
leaves its sick and their families to fend for them- 
selves). This gives the doctor a powerful point of entry 
into the patient’s psyche, and also amounts to a de- 
structuration of the patient’s conventional under- 
standings and social personality. It is the function of 
the relationship between the doctor and the patient to 
restructure those understandings and that persona- 
lity; to bring them back into the fold of society and 
plant them firmly within the epistemological and 
ontological groundwork from which the society’s 
basic ideological premises arise. In modern clinical 
practice and medical culture. this function is camou- 
flaged. The issue of control and manipulation is con- 
cealed by the aura of benevolence. The social charac- 
ter of the medical encounter is not immediately 
obvious in the way that it is in the communal healing 
rites of “primitive” societies. With us, consultation 
and heating occurs in privatized and individualistic 
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settings, and the moral and metaphysical components 
of disease and healing are concealed by the use of the 
natural science model. 
As Susan Sontag has recently emphasized [S], while 
the symptoms and signs of disease usually have a 
decidely and all too material quality, they are some- 
thing else besides. We might say that they are social 
as well as physical and biological facts. We glimpse 
this if we reflect but for a moment on the vastly differ- 
ent meanings conveyed by signs and symptoms at dif- 
ferent points in history and in different cultures. Fat- 
ness, thinness, blood in one’s urine, let alone blood 
per se, headache, nightmares, lassitude, coughing, 
blurred vision, dizziness, and so forth, acquire vastly 
different meanings and significance at different times 
in history, in different classes of society, and so on. 
Two points are raised here. The manifestations of dis- 
ease are like symbols, and the diagnostician sees them 
and interprets them with an eye trained by the social 
determinants of perception. Yet this is denied by an 
ideology or epistemology which regards its creations 
as really lying “out-there”-solid, substantial things- 
in-themselvves. Our minds like cameras or carbon 
paper do nothing more than faithfully register the 
facts of life. This illusion is ubiquitous in our culture, 
is what Lukacs means by reification stemming from 
the commodity-structure, and medical practice is a 
singularly important way of maintaining the denial as 
to the social facticity of facts. Things thereby take on 
a life of their own, sundered from the social nexus 
that really-gives them life, and remain locked in their 
own self-constitution. 
Today in various nooks and crannies called consultation 
rooms, diagnosticians listen for the same elements and 
when they find them they do not say, I can put these things 
together and call them hysteria if I like (much as a little 
boy can sort his marbles now by size, now by colour, now 
by age); rather, the diagnostician, when he has completed 
his sort says: This patient is a hysteric! Here, then, is the 
creator denying authorship of his creation. Why? Because 
in turn he receives a greater prize; the reassurance that out 
there is a stable world; it is not all in his head [6]. 
What is revealed to us here is the denial of author- 
ship, the denial of relationship, and the denial of the 
reciprocity of process to the point where the manifold 
armory of assumptions, leaps of faith and a priori 
categories are ratified as real and natural. In another 
idiom, the arbitrariness of the sign is discoxifirmed 
and no longer seen as arbitrary because it is affixed in 
the patient, therewith securing the semiotic of the dis- 
ease iangue. And if the diagnostician is thereby re- 
assured as to the reality of the world as thinghood 
writ large, and by this dispenses with the discomfort 
of being at too close quarters with the reality of what 
is but the social construction of reality, it is not that it 
is ‘all in his head” but that it is all in the relationship 
of physicians and patients which is at stake. The rela- 
tionship is worked over and sundered. Reciprocity lies 
victim to the assault performed on it. Likewise, the 
patient and the concept of disease have been recruited 
in the service of building a reality whose stability, 
which cannot be denied so long as professional exper- 
tise bears down, is nevertheless prone to violent alter- 
cations as the pressure of: denied authorship and reci- 
procity makes its presence felt. This presence of denial 
is itself masked by the illusion of reciprocity of a dif- 
ferent sort; the niceties of style in the bedside manner 
and the culture of caring. Foucault directs our atten- 
tion to this in his discussion of changes in psychiatry, 
in terms that apply to all of modern clinical science: 
Madness no longer exists except as seen. The proximity 
instituted by the asylum, an intimacy neither chains nor 
bars would violate again, does not allow reciprocity: only 
the nearness of observation that watches, that spies, that 
comes closer in order to see better, but moves ever further 
away, since it accepts and acknowledges only the values of 
the Stranger. The science of mental disease.. would not 
be a dialogue.. . [7J 
Because it does this; medical practice inevitably 
produces grotesque mystifications in which we all 
flounder, grasping ever more pitifully for security in a 
man-made world which we see not as social, not as 
human, not as historical, but as a world of a priori 
objects beholden only to their own force and laws, 
dutifully illuminated for us by professional experts 
such as doctors. There are many political messages 
subtly encouraged by all of this for those who become 
patients, and we all become patients at some time, 
and we are all patients in a metaphorical sense of the 
social “doctors” who minister our needs. Don’t trust 
your senses. Don’t trust the feeling of uncertainty and 
ambiguity inevitably occurring as the socially condi- 
tioned senses try to orchestrate the multitude of 
meanings given to otherwise mute things. Don’t con- 
template rebellion against the facts of life for these are 
not in some important manner partially man-made, 
but are irretrievably locked in the realm of physical 
matter. To the degree that matter can be manipulated. 
leave that to “science” and your doctor. 
THE PATIENT 
By way of illustration (rigorousiy preserving the 
anonymity of the people and organizations involved) 
I want to discuss the situation of a 49 years-old white 
working class woman with a history of multiple hos- 
pital admissions over the past 8 years with a diagnosis 
of polymyositis-inflammation of many muscles. 
According to medical authority, this is a fatal chrohic 
diseas.5 consisting in the progressive deterioration of 
muscle. Classified as a rheumatoid disease of un- 
known cause, treatment consists largely in the admin- 
istration of heavy doses of steroids at the times when 
the disease waxes in order to decelerate the inflamma- 
tion. I met her in the’wards of a prestigious teaching 
hospital in 1978, where we talked for some 4 hr on 
five occasions. I introduced myself as a physician and 
anthropologist, interested in patients’ views of sick- 
ness. 
She described her condition as disease of the 
muscles. They deteriorate, and it’s terminal. It is a 
terrible tiredness, she says, which comes and goes in 
relation to stress. What worries her is being without 
control during the acute phases. As she puts. it, the 
switch to her body, between her mind and body, 
becomes switched qff. The. attic is cut off from the 
basement. When she gives examples, it is always in 
situations where she is working for others; washing 
the dishes for example. When asked what she thought 
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might be the cause of her disease. it turned out that 
she constantly asked herself why she had it, never 
stopped asking herself “why?“; “Why me, Oh Lord, 
why me?” 
Her search for explanation and meaning remains 
dissatisfied with what the medical profession offers. 
As we shall see, she demands a totalizing synthesis 
which she herself provides by reading contradictory 
cultural themes into her symptoms, signs, and pro- 
gress. These contradictions are exhibited by her reac- 
tions to the obicer dicta of medical professionals, to 
the patterns of discipline enforced by the hospital, and 
to the conflicts systematically coursing through 
society in general. Moreover, her mode of under- 
standing and explanation runs counter to the master 
paradigms in our culture which dichotomize mind 
from matter, morality from physical determinism, and 
“things” from the social context and human meaning 
in which they inhere. In being foreign to accepted 
cultural consciousness in these crucial ways, her 
attempts to provide a synthetic understanding of 
physical things cannot but be tensed and prone to 
instability. 
Her first response was to say that the cause of her 
condition is “an unhappy reason”. At the age of 15 
and contrary to her mother’s desire, she married a 
factory worker who soon became unable to support 
her and the five children born in the following 5 years 
due to his alcoholism. She had a tubal ligation fol- 
lowed shortly thereafter by a re-stagement, and then 
six more pregnancies all resulting in miscarriages. She 
took in washing, ironed, and gleaned garbage for bot- 
tles which she sold. There was rarely money sufficient 
for food and she was constantly exhausted and 
hungry. She would go without food in order to give it 
to the children who were frequently sick. In turn, she 
caught many of their sicknesses, because she was so 
weak and tired. Life was this endless round of 
poverty, exertion, exhaustion, and sickness. ‘Surely 
that could cause polymyositis,” she says. “You can 
take a perfect piece of cloth and if you rub it on the 
scrub board long enough, you’re going to wear holes 
in it. It’s going to be in shreds. You can take a healthy 
person and take away the things that they heed that 
are essential, and they become thin and sickly. So I 
mean.. it all just comes together.” She has never 
approached her doctors with this idea because “They 
would laugh at my ignorance. But it does seem right; 
that tiredness and work all the time. Take the 
children of India without enough food, dragging their 
swollen bellies around, tired and hungry. Surely they 
could have this disease too. Only because they haven’t 
got hospitals, nobody knows it.” 
In making these connections, the patient elaborates 
on the connection she has in mind between poly- 
myositis as muscle degeneration and her life-exper- 
ience of oppression, of muscular exertion, and of 
bodily sacrifice. What seems especially significant here 
is that the causes she imputes as well as her under- 
standing of the disease stand as iconic metaphors and 
metonyms of one another, all mapped into the disease 
as the arch-metaphor standing for that oppression. 
This could well form the highly charged imagery lead- 
ing to a serious critique of basic social institutions. 
But, as we shall see, other aspects of the situation 
mitigate this potentiality. 
She then went on to develop the idea that there 
also exists an hereditary or quasi-hereditary causal 
factor. In her opinion. one of her daughters is possibly 
afflicted with the disease, and two of that daughter’s 
daughters also. She feels extremely close to this 
daughter, to the point where she maintains that there 
is a mystical attachment between them, of Extra-Sen- 
sory Perception, as she says. Even when they are far 
apart physically, each one knows what is happening 
to the other, especially at a time of crisis, when they 
come to each other’s aid. She elaborates on the con- 
cept that the disease is present in this matriline, mani- 
festing itself in four distinct stages correlated to the 
four ages of the four females involved. In passing, it is 
worth noting that the males in the family history 
come in for little mention with the exception of her 
first husband who is seen as a destructive and even 
evil figure. Her immediate social world is seen by her 
as centered on the history of four generations of 
women, beginning with her mother who raised the 
family in dire poverty. This characteristic matriline or 
reciprocating women in the networks of working class 
families is in this case vividly expressed by the mysti- 
cal closeness she feels for her daughter, and by the 
mapping of these social relations into the disease as a 
metaphor of those relations. 
The fact that the youngest granddaughter involved 
was seriously ill when a few months of age, and that 
the doctors found an “orgasm” in her blood, suggests 
to the patient the possibility that a foreign-agent or 
bacterial aetiology plays a part too; the foreign-agent 
disappearing into the body to slowly develop the full- 
blown presentation of the disease at a later date. The 
attribution of disease to a foreign-agent would seem 
as old as human-kind. But only with modern Western 
medicine and the late nineteenth century “germ 
theory of disease” did this idea largely shed itself of 
the notion that the foreign-agent was an expression of 
specific social relations. In this patient’s case, how- 
ever, the foreign-agent aetiology is systematically 
woven into the fabric of her closest relationships and 
metaphorically expresses them. 
Finally, the patient develops the idea that God 
stands at a crucial point in the causal complex. She 
mentions that God gave her this disease in order to 
teach doctors how to cure it-a typical resolution of 
the oppositions redolent in her account of passivity 
and activity, receiving and giving, crime and sacrifice. 
She notes that in the Bible it is said. to seek first and 
then go to the Lord, meaning, she says, go first to the 
medical profession and then try out religion. It is this 
long march that she has indeed put into practice as 
much as in her working through a theory of aetiology. 
At this stage of our discussion, she summarized a 
good deal of her position thus. 
“You see, protein builds muscle and yet my 
children were lucky if they got protein once a month, 
and I was lucky. Now I have polymyositis, plus the 
arthritis, and my daughter has arthritis of the spine, 
and her little daughter is affected by it, has inherited 
it, plus her younger daughter yet. Now there seems to 
be a pattern there. You see I was deprived of it and 
my children were deprived of it and we’ve both come 
down with a chronic disease. We’re not too sure that 
she doesn’t have polymyositis. The breakdown of the 
muscles and the tissues due to strain and work were 
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weakened by the fact that you didn’t have enough 
protein and so on, so that when the bug comes along, 
you are a prime target for it! . ,God gives us a free 
will. I went very much against God’s will.. . when I 
went out and got married at 15, stomped my feet and 
told my mother I’d go out and get pregnant if she 
didn’t let me marry the boy. I don’t believe that God 
gave me the disease, but he allowed.. . me to get the 
disease. He suffered me over many mountains. And 
on the same hand, I was in the perfect situation for 
contracting the disease or for the development of the 
disease whether it’s hereditary or catching. . nobody 
knows yet.. . Does that make sense? When I’m laying 
quietly thinking. . . the train of thought goes along 
and you wonder why? You know; Oh why me Lord? 
Why all the ups and downs? But .it’s not God’s fault 
that I got sick; it’s the fault of the environment I lived 
in! Now, with God’s help which I hadn’t asked for at 
that time; I could have overcome many of my hard- 
ships but I was too proud! And we have to be humble 
before God.. . So you see our environment has very 
much to do with our health and with our mental 
outlook on life.. . it has everything to do.. our 
morals and clean living, a proper diet.. all these 
things they all go together.. . they all fit into a neat 
little puzzle if you sit long enough and look at them 
right. You have a neat little puzzle that all fits very 
neatly together.. .“. 
This moving passage calls for far larger commen- 
tary than I can make here. Her concern with the 
meaning and especially with the moral meaning of her 
illness stands out, reinforcing the argument that 
behind every reified disease theory in our society 
lurks an organizing realm of moral concerns. In her 
case, God is by no means seen as the prime or even 
ultimate cause of her disease. Rather, it is the moral 
quality of her actions, in going against her mother 
and so on, and the moral actions of her husband, 
which offended the moral code embodied in God’s 
directives, that determined which way the potentiali- 
ties inherent to her material situation or environment 
would develop. The elegant simplicity of Evans-Prit- 
chard’s exegesis and solution of Azande epistemology 
into “mystical”, “scientific”, and “empirical” cate- 
gories, as a way of bridging their belief system with 
outs, becomes of dubious value. It is hard here to see 
a simple chain of causes stretching from ultimate to 
immediate, along the lines suggested by Evans-Prit- 
chard for the Azande. Instead, we are presented with 
a system of internal relationships, a series of encysting 
and encysted contingencies permeating each other’s 
potentials drawn into one grand pattern-or, rather, 
into “one neat little puzzle that all fits very neatly 
together”. 
In so far as modern medical practice ostensibly 
focuses exclusively on the “how” of disease, and reifies 
pathology in doing so, it might appear to be perform- 
ing a rather helpful and healthy maneuver in expung- 
ing guilt. But as the situation so movingly reveals, 
nothing could be further from the truth. Through a 
series of exceedingly complex operations, reification 
serves to adhere guilt to disease. The real task of ther- 
apy calls for an archaeology of the implicit in such a 
way that the processes by which social relations are 
mapped into diseases are brought to light, de-reified, 
and in doing so liberate the potential for dealing with 
antagonistic contradictions and breaking the chains 
of oppression. 
Professionahsm and feijcation 
In talking about her relationships with other sick 
people in the ward, the patient noted that “I couldn’t 
have survived without the help of the other patients 
these eight weeks”. She dwelt on the fact that hospita- 
lization drew patients to one another in very personal 
and usually sympathetic ways. “I really do think you 
have a better understanding of people and their likes, 
dislikes, and their personalities here. Being sick gives 
you a tolerance for other people’s faults. You really 
have a better bond because that person already 
knows your faults. You know. You don’t have to put 
on a false face. These are things that, uh, a doctor 
naturally doesn’t have time to sit down and think 
about.. . They don’t feel the pain. They give an order 
what to do but they don’t feel the pain. So they really 
don’t know what type of hazard your’re going 
through.” 
She has made firm friendships with patients whom 
she now visits when out of hospital, but with the staff 
“it’s different because naturally your doctor and your 
nurse have your medical part to think of. Where we 
lay here and we talk about our families and the things 
we like to do or the things we like to eat, you become 
on a more intimate basis. It’s.. . the professional part 
is gone. But your doctor is still.. . even though he’s 
becoming more lenient in his ways, I believe he’s still 
got to keep the upper hand professionally.” 
Following her statement that she couldn’t have sur- 
vived the past 8 weeks if it hadn’t been for the other 
patients, she goes on to discuss her physical therapy. 
“You see I can’t walk. I’m just now learning all over 
again from my illness. You have to learn. You have to 
relearn to take one step at a time.. . like a child. I’ve 
been.confined solely to this bed. If my tray had been 
left over there by the nurse.. . her niind is on another 
medical problem that she’s got to face next. But 
Becky who’s lying in the bed next to me can get up 
and move over and get my stuff where I can reach it. 
Or.. . if I can’t reach my light, she’ll turn her light on 
for me and then tell them who needs service. Now I’m 
able to stand if you give me the proper instructions, 
and, and . . . but you see I’m re-educating all the 
muscles and Becky couldn’t help me there. Where see 
the professional, your young professional girl is 
trained to teach . . . On the other hand the profes- 
sional couldn’t give me the personal attention that 
Becky has given me. Something just as simple as pull- 
ing the curtains back so that I can see more than just 
a curtain and the white ceiling. I can’t get up to do it 
myself, but Becky can. Your friendship and your 
mutual understandings, you know, you really get to 
know a person whether the’re kind or really interested 
in you. Such as I spoke every morning very kindly to 
this elderly lady (in the opposite bed). I know she can 
hear me but she wants absolutely nothing to do with 
me. She’s far above me. I take it she has money. Her 
daughter is a doctor. She wants nothing to do with 
me and yet I haven’t hurt. her.. . I don’t have any 
small children. but Becky does and I’ve gone through 
the things she is now going through so we have 
mutual interests. I’m the grandmother of 19.” 
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I ask her why another patient couldn’t help her 
walking. She replies. “Because she would teach you 
wrong, when a professional already knows and has 
evaluated your muscle strength. And there, uh, you 
know automatically that you can trust the nurse. But 
Becky hasn’t been taught how to grab me or stabilize 
me.. . or to tell me which muscle to use to keep 
myself from collapsing. So, see, she can’t help me pro- 
fessionally. So our whole friendship has to be on 
a.. . on a I like you and you like me basis. That tech- 
nician still has her mind working on far beyond mine. 
Mine is strictly in trying to accomplish what she has 
already learned and knows.” 
I ask ; “But say the professional teaches you to walk 
backwards and forwards between a couple of things 
several times a day. Couldn’t someone like Becky who 
isn’t bedridden help you to exercise?” 
“No! Because she doesn’t know the extent of your 
energies.” 
“But the professional does?” 
“The professional has to figure this out before she 
starts the exercises.” 
“You yourself wouldn’t know the capacity of your 
own energy so you could tell?” 
“No! No!” 
Here the loss of autonomy to which Ivan Illich 
refers in his book Medical Nemesis is strikingly 
expressed [S]. The potential within the patient as 
much as that which exists between patients for devel- 
oping a therapeutic milieu is agonizingly cut short. 
The relationship with other patients becomes almost 
purely “expressive”, while the relationship with the 
professionals becomes purely “instrumental”. As each 
type of relationship is driven to its extreme in pure 
subjectivity and pure objectivity, so each is threatened 
with self-destruction as it teeters on expressiveness 
without substance, and instrumentation without 
expression or participation. The replication of our 
cultural epistemology into subject-hood and object- 
hood is here presented in its most naked form. The 
same epistemology is also replicated in the patient’s 
understanding, reinforced by the professionals, of the 
workings of her body; namely the structure and func- 
tion of musculature. As opposed to an organic con- 
ception of the inner dialectical interplay of muscles 
with one another and with thought and will, here 
muscle function is conceived of atomistically, separate 
from mind and will, and each muscle is objectified as 
something separate from the synergistic interplay of 
musculo-skeletal holism. And in her regarding the 
professional as knowing better than she as to the 
extent of her energies, we may well-regard the aliena- 
tion of her own senses as complete, handed over to 
the professional who has become the guardian or 
banker of her mind. 
This splitting of subjectivity from objectivity as 
represented by patient-good and professionalism, re- 
spectively, resulting in the capturing of her subjec- 
tivity by the professional, is as much a result of the 
patients’ inability to develop the mutual aid potential 
still present in the patient sub-culture as it is due to 
the relationship between professional and patient. The 
former derives from the latter, and both contrast 
strikingly with the social relations and culture de- 
scribed by Joshua Horn for the Chinese hospitals in 
which he worked from 1954 to 1969. 
The patients often select representatives to convey their 
opinions and suggestions to teams of doctors. nurses and 
orderlies who have day-to-day responsibility in relation to 
specific groups of patients. These teams meer daily to plan 
the day’s work. Ambulant patients play an active part in 
ward affairs. They take their meals in the ward dining- 
room and many of them help patients who are confined to 
bed, reading newspapers to them. keeping them company 
and becoming familiar with their medical and social prob- 
lems. I conduct a ward round in a different ward each day 
and as I do so, I usually collect a retinue of patients who 
go with me, look and listen and often volunteer informa- 
tion [9]. 
The alienation of the patient’s self-understanding 
and capacity is all the more striking when we learn 
that she has extensive practical experience with physi- 
cal therapy and that out of the hospital context and 
away from the aura of professionals, she does in fact 
regard herself as skilled and powerful in this regard. 
Speaking about her sprained knee suffered some years 
back she says, “And then I had to learn to walk again. 
I’m always learning to walk! I really ought to be well- 
trained. I could be a therapist.. I trained my 
daughter after she had polio. And they refused to take 
her at the polio center. I taught her to walk. Her left 
side was paralyzed (the same side that the patient 
always refers to as her weak and occasionally almost 
paralyzed side). I learnt from a friend. I used to 
have to get up and I’d sit on top of her and stretch 
her hamstrings and stretch her arm muscles and 
things and it was 3 months before I got any response 
at all. And then one night when I was stretching her 
hamstrings she screamed because she said that it hurt 
too much. Well I sat down and had a good cry. 
Mother couldn’t even continue therapy that night. 
And from then on, the more it hurt, the more therapy 
I gave her. And the year from the day that they told 
me she’d never walk again, I walked back in to the 
doctor and I showed her what one person could do 
with God’s help. You have to be gentle. And this 
comes from love, compassion, and the desire to help 
another human being. And you’d be surprised how 
really strong my hands are I never lose the strength of 
my hands. I don’t know why. But through all of this I 
have never completely lost my.. my hands.” 
So, we are faced with a contradiction. And this con- 
tradiction is just as much present in the hospital situ- 
ation and in the professional-patient relationship so 
that the loss of autonomy and the cultural lobotomi- 
zation is never complete. For a few days later the 
patient refused what was considered an important 
part of her treatment, just as during an earlier stay in 
hospital she created a wild scene by throwing her 
coffee on the floor when the staff refused to give her 
more medication for pain. 
On this earlier occasion she insisted that her pain 
was increasing. The staff regarded this as “secondary 
gain”. The nurses’ plan was to “give support and reas- 
surance; allow the patient to express her feelings. 
Monitor emotion regarding status and shift”. It is, of 
course, this mode of perception--“monitor emo- 
tion . . “-which so tellingly contrasts with the type 
of observation that passes between patients, and 
which should be referred back to my earlier citation 
from Foucault, the perception which 
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does not allow of reciprocity: only the nearness of an 
observation that watches, that spies, that comes closer in 
order to see better, but moves ever further away, since it 
accepts and acknowledges only the value of the Stranger. 
Following the innovation and supposedly more 
humane “problem-oriented approach”, which is now 
also taught to medical students, the nurses’ progress 
notes are written up in the form of the different prob- 
lems the patient has. Each problem is then analysed 
into four parts in accord with the S.O.A.P. formula: 
Subjective (the patient’s perception), Objective (the 
nurse’s observation), Analysis (interpretation of data), 
and Plan. Soap--the guarantee of cleanliness and the 
barrier to pollution! Subjectivity, objectivity, analysis, 
and plan! What better guarantee and symbolic 
expression could be dreamt of to portray. as if by 
farce, the reification of living processes and the aliena-. 
tion of subject from object? And, as one might sus- 
pect, this formulation is congruent with the need for 
computerizing records and more rationally preparing 
safeguards against malpractice suits. The Plan? “Give 
support and reassurance. Relate feelings of trust.” 
How much does this packaging of “care”, “trust”, and 
“feelings”. this intstrumentation of what we used to 
think of a spontaneous human transitiveness and 
mutuality, cost, according to Blue Cross? 
A few days later, the patient complained of more 
pain, and of her inability to urinate (although accord- 
ing to the nursing staff she could urinate). The night 
following she became angry and threw her coffee at a 
nurse who then called a doctor. He reported; “Patient 
had a significant episode of acting out. Accused nurs- 
ing personnel and myself of lying and disrespect. Ex- 
tremely anxious and agitated. Crying. Had thrown a 
cup of coffee at the R.N. (Registered Nurse). Patient 
refused to acknowledge any other precipitating event 
or underlying emotion. Husband arrived and calmed 
patient down. Psychiatric recommendation with Dr Y 
and began initiating dose of Haloperidol. Will also 
add 75 mg/day amitriptiline for apparent on-going 
depressive state with anxiety.” (Haloperidol is de- 
scribed by Goodman and Gillman [lo] as a drug 
which calms and induces sleep in excited patients. 
Because it produces a high incidence of extrapyrami- 
da1 reactions it’ should be initiated with caution.) 
This is the first time that the doctor’s notes mention 
that the patient is distressed, although the nurses’ 
notes chart her increasing dissatisfaction going back 
over several days. The nurse’s report of the same inci- 
dent leaves out. for the first time, the S (subjective 
category) and goes straight to Objectivity:. “Patient 
was so upset when she was told that somebody said 
that she can get out of bed and use the bedside com- 
mode. She said that nurse is.. . and for her anger 
threw her cupbf coffee on the floor. Crying and wants 
her husband to be called because she’s very upset. 
Saying dirty words.” Analysis: “Patient is very upset”. 
Plan: Dr X notified and patient was told to calm 
down since she’s not the only patient on the floor, 
that others are very sick and upset from her noise. 
Patient claims that she is not sick. Patient quiets 
down when her husband came and friendly to the 
nurses.” The next day the doctor’s notes say that the 
patient is quite angry and that her anger takes the 
form of sobbing and threatening to leave hospital and 
warn friends about care here. The day after that, the 
nurses report that the chaplain talked to the patient 
for half an hour so she’ll be able to release all her 
tensions, anxiety, and conflict. The chaplain said that 
she’s angry of something. The Plan notes that the 
chaplain will come every day and that she’s a bit nicer 
to the staff and courteous when she needs something. 
The doctor’s notes describe the patient as “stable” 
and thereafter never mention her scene. The nurse’s 
report says that she is still complaining of pain, Sub- 
jective category, and requesting pain medication, 
Objective category. As for her “anxiety problem” the 
Objective entry says “she is talking about how people 
don’t believe she can do nothing for herself.” And the 
next day she went home. 
It is surely of some importance that the patient was 
examined (sic) by a psychiatrist the morning of the 
same day when she later threw her coffee (on the 
floor, according to the nurses; at a nurse, according to 
the doctor). The nurses’ report noted that she was 
crying and trembling following the visit of the psy- 
chiatrist, whose own report says that the “evidence is 
strongly suggestive of an organic brain syndrome”. 
She said it was January when it was Decemb’er. The 
psychiatrist had just wakened her. She “demonstrated 
some looseness of associations”, “at times was difficult 
to follow as she jumped from topic to topic”, and on 
serial subtractions from 50 she made three errors. 
Having stated that the evidence was strongly sugges- 
rive of an organic brain syndrome (i.e. a physical dis- 
ease of the brain) the psychiatrist in his Recommehda- 
tions wrote: “Regarding the patient’s organic brain 
syndrome. . . ” In other words, what was initially put 
forward as a suggestion (and what a suggestion!) now 
becomes a real thing. The denial of authorship could 
not be more patent. 
The significance of this episode is that apart from 
illustrating yet another horror story of hospitalization 
it reveals how the clinical situation becomes a combat 
zone of disputes over power and over definitions of 
illness and degrees of incapacity. The critical issue 
centers on the evaluation of incapacity and of feelings, 
such as pain, and following that on the treatment 
necessary. Here is where the professionals deprive the 
patients of their senSe of certainty and security con- 
cerning their own self-judgement. 
By necessity, self-awareness and self-judgement 
require other persons’ presence and reflection. In the 
clinical situation, this dialectic of self and other must 
always favor the defining power of the other written 
into the aura of the healer who must therefore treat 
this power with great sensitivity lest it slip away into 
a totally one-sided assertion of reality, remaining a 
relationship in name only. The healer attempts to 
modulate and mold the patient’s self-awareness with- 
out dominating it to the point of destruction, for if 
that happens then the healer loses an ally in the strug- 
gle with dis-ease. Yet, as illustrated in this case study, 
a quite vicious procedure precludes this alliance and 
the patient is converted into an enemy. It is not, as 
Illich maintains, for example, that patients lose their 
autonomy. Far from it. Instead, what happens is that 
the modern clinical situation engenders a contradic- 
tory situation in which the patient swings like a pen- 
dulum between alienated passivity and alienated self- 
assertion. 
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Paradoxically, this follows from an ever-increasing 
self-consciousness on the part of health professionals 
to be more humane and to self-consciously allow the 
patient’s definition of the problem a privileged place 
in the medical dialogue, only to co-opt that definition 
in a practice which becomes more rationalized as it 
becomes less humanized. This rationalization 
amounts to an attempt to wrest control from the 
patient and define their status for them by first com- 
partmentalizing the person into the status of patient- 
hood, then into the status of thing-hood as opposed 
to that of a mutually interacting partner in an 
exchange, and then into the categories of Objective 
and Subjective, working through these reifications by 
an Analysis and a Plan. The analogy with the rationa- 
lity of commodity production is complete. As with 
automobiles on the assembly-line, so with patients 
and with health itself, the difference, the pathos, and 
the occasional problem bearing mute testimony to the 
fact that unlike automobiles, patients do think and 
feel, and that sickness is as much an interactive 
human relationship as a thing-in-itself. 
My intention here is not only to direct attention to 
the callousness that results. In addition, we have to 
deal with the complicated mystification present in 
healing in any culture, but which in our own modem 
clinical setting perniciously cannibalizes the potential 
source of strength for curing which reposes in the 
inter-subjectivity of patient and healer. In the name of 
the noble cause of healing, the professionals have 
been able to appropriate this mutuality and in a very 
real sense exploit a social relationship in such a way 
that its power to heal is converted into the power to 
control. The problems that ensue, at least as illus- 
trated in this case study, lie in the very nature of the 
clinical setting and therefore are especially opaque to 
the therapists. As the Chaplain so forlornly noted, 
“She’s angry of something,” and this anger stems from 
the contradictions which assail the patient. On the 
one hand she sees the capacity for “mere” patients to 
form a therapeutic community. But on the other 
hand,. she denies the flowering of this potential 
because of her being forced to allow the professionals 
to appropriate her discretionary powers, while at 
another instant she rebels against this appropriation. 
The circuit of reification and re-subjectification is in- 
herently unstable. Health professionalization of this 
all too common type does not guarantee the smooth 
control that the staff demand, let alone what patients 
need. All of which will assuredly be met by yet further 
rationalization and more professionalization. 
On her later admission to hospital and shortly after 
first talking to me about patients supporting one 
another, only to claim that it required a professional 
therapist to help her walk, the patient suddenly 
refused the ministrations of the Occupational Thera- 
pists. She complainted that all her day was taken up 
with therapy, that the Occupational Therapist took 
an hour a day, and that she had time neither to use 
the bedpan, to comb her hair, nor to listen to her 
religious music. “When I’m sick,” she declared, “I 
can’t work eight hours a day! And yet the whole 
theory of my disease and getting better is rest. And so 
I broke down this morning and I told the Occupa- 
tional Therapist I had to cut her hour out. I’ve got to 
make an hour sometime during the day when I can 
just relax and not be getting in and out of a chair 
which hurts me severely. There’s no time for anything 
of a personal nature.. so the stress and the emo- 
tional conflict is there. And there’s never any time to 
solve it by myself. And there was no place. because 
there are only eight hours. I can’t put twelve hours 
into eight!” 
Again we see that the passive alienation embodied 
in her relation with the professionals, which at ‘first 
sight appears to be a fait accompli. registers an abrupt 
rupture, a “scene”. which ripples panic amongst the 
staff. 
The Occupational Therapists, the Physical Thera- 
pists and the Social Workers were all deeply upset by 
this gesture which they saw as a denial of their effi- 
cacy and of their jobs. When I asked them why they 
couldn’t leave her alone for a week, their leader rep- 
lied, “It’s my Blue Cross, Blue Shield payments as 
much as hers!” So, they drew up a contract with the 
patient, nowadays a typical procedure in the hospital 
as it is in many U.S. schools. 
Contracting 
The staff and the patient both sign a written con- 
tract stating, for example, “What you do have choices 
about.” “What you do not have choices about,” 
“Objectives,” “What we will do,” “What you will do.” 
In this patient’s case the contract stated as “objec- 
tive”, walk 30 feet three times a day. “What we will 
do,” protect two 45 min rest periods. “What you will 
do,” try and walk. The underlying motive, as de- 
scribed by some theorists of medical contracting, is 
that the staff will reward the patient for complying 
with their desires (positive reinforcement), rather than 
falling into what is seen as the trap of the old style of 
doing things which, supposedly. was to reinforce non- 
compliance by paying more attention to such behav- 
ior than to compliance. It is, in short, Behaviorism 
consciously deployed on the lines of market contracts 
in order to achieve social control. It is the medication 
of business applied to the business of medicine. Re- 
wards cited in the academic and professional journals 
dealing with this subject are lottery tickets, money, 
books, magazines, assistance in filling out insurance 
forms, information, and time with the “health care 
provider” [ 111. It has been found that patients often 
choose more time with the “health provider” and help 
in untangling bureaucratic snarls so as to obtain in- 
surance benefits and medical referrals. 
The very concept of the “health care provider”, so 
disarmingly. straightforward, functional, and matter- 
of-fact, is precisely the type of ideological Iabelling 
that drives patients into so-called non-compliance. 
The “health care provider”, in antediluvian times 
known as the nurse, doctor, etc., does not provide 
health! Health is part of the human condition, as is 
disease, and the incidence and manifestations of both 
are heavily determined by the specificities of social 
organization. Health care depends for its outcome on 
a two-way relationship between the sick and the 
healer. In so far as health care is provided, both 
patient and healer are providing it, and, indeed the 
concern with so-called non-compliance is testimony 
to that, in a back-handed way. By pre-establishing the 
professional as the “health care provider”, the inher- 
ited social legacy that constitutes medical wisdom and 
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power is a priori declared to be the legitimate mono- 
poly of those who can convince the rest of us that this 
wisdom comes from society and nature in a pre-pack- 
aged commodity form which they and only they can 
dispense. And in choosing as rewards for non-com- 
pliant patients help in overcoming the snarls which 
the “health care providers” provided is to heap 
absurdity on deception. But the real pathos in this is 
neither the absurdity nor the deception. It is that it 
appears, in our day and age, to be so perfectly 
straight-forward and reasonable. This is the mark of 
ideology; its naturalness. And if its nature is to be 
found in the realm and language of marketing, so that 
medical culture and healing too succumb to the idiom 
of business, then we must not be all that surprised. 
For ours is the culture of business which puts busi- 
ness as the goal of culture. 
In the same way that freedom and a specific type of 
individualism came long ago to be asserted with the 
rise of the free market economy, so the introduction 
of contracting in healing today is seen by its pro- 
ponents to be a bold blow for the assertion of human 
rights, shattering the mystification of the feudal 
past when patients complied with doctors’ commands 
out of blind trust. The proponents of contracting in 
clinical settings also tell us that the doctrine on which 
it is based, Behaviorism and the “laws” of reinforce- 
ment and extinction, have led to “the treatment of 
maladaptive human behaviors, including psychoses, 
retardation, alcoholism, low work productivity, and 
criminality” [12]. 
Maladaptation is of course not a thing, but a purely 
normative concept travelling under the disguise of 
scientific jargon. More often than not it serves in con- 
texts such as these to smuggle in a particular inten- 
tion or value by making it appear to be a fact like a 
fact of nature. The assimilation of low work producti- 
vity. criminality, and psychosis to one another as 
parts of the same fact, maladaptation, and now to 
patients who disobey doctors’ “orders”, serves to 
remind us just how colossal a distortion is involved 
by reifying social relations so that pointed political 
vulues smuggled under the guise of technical con- 
structs remain immune to criticism, stamped with the 
authority of the hard and impenetrable scientific fact. 
Once again, the nature of truth is seen to lie in the 
truth of nature, and not in some critical way as 
dependent upon the social organization of facts and 
nature. 
In the case of the patient described in this case 
study we might note the following. She had every 
good reason for not complying with the staffs orders. 
This reason was not appreciated by the staff. It was 
seen as a threat to their power and to the coffers of 
Blue Cross. It was not the case, as the aforementioned 
authorities on contracting say, that because she was 
non-compliant she was getting more attention from 
the staff. It was totally the opposite. When she was 
complying she was getting too much attention, and all 
she wanted was free time. The immediate cause of her 
frustration was intimately related to the bureaucratic 
pressure of her daily routine. The contracting strategy 
chosen by the staff was thus ingeniously selected to 
meet this by further bureaucratizing an agreement, 
the contract, so as to formally deformalize her time 
into therapy time and “free time,” time which any 
freedom lover would have naively thought was hers in 
the first place, anyway, and not something to be 
owned and dispensed by the staff. The idea that she 
was free to choose and contract, and the idea that 
contracting per se is both sign and cause of freedom 
is as pernicious an illusion that the free time the staff 
were granting her was not rightfully hers in the first 
place. 
The argument in favor of contracting, that it clears 
away the mystifications in the murky set of under- 
standings existing between doctor and patient, that-it 
increases the power, understanding, and autonomy of 
the patient, is a fraud. Moreover, it is a fraud which 
highlights the false consciousness as to freedom and 
individualism upon which our society rests. Can 
autonomy and freedom be really said to be increased 
when it is the staff which has the power to set the 
options and the terms of the contract? If anything, 
autonomy and freedom are decreased because the 
illusion of freedom serves to obscure its absence. Fur- 
thermore, the type of freedom at stake in the contract- 
ing amounts to a convenient justification for denying 
responsibility and interpersonal obligations, just as in 
the name of contract and free enterprise the working 
class at the birth of modern capitalism was told that it 
was as free and as equal as the capitalists with whom 
they had to freely contract for the sale of their labor- 
power. There is little difference between that situation, 
the capitalist labor market, and the one which con- 
cerns us wherein the clinical setting becomes a health 
market and one contracts as a supposedly free agent 
with the “health care providers” so as to grant the 
latter the right to appropriate the use-value power 
embodied in the healing process. 
Far from increasing patient autonomy (as its pro- 
ponents argue), the design of contracting is unabash- 
edly manipulative. 
Requests for lS.min of uninterrupted conversation with n 
team member, games of checkers, cards and chess, Bible 
reading, discussion of current events and visits from 
various team members are examples of rewards chosen by 
patients. Such examples as these imply that patients place 
considerable value on our interactions with them. It also 
indicates that because patients value our relationships with 
them, we are in a powerful position for influencing the 
choice of behavior the patient ultimately makes; e.g. com- 
pliance versus non-compliance [13]. 
Just as we were wont to believe that medical care 
differed from business, as in Talcott Parsons’ analysis 
whereby the “collectivity orientation” of the medical 
profession was opposed to the business ethic of self- 
interest, only to become increasingly disillusioned, so 
now we find that even friendship is something to be 
bargained for and contracted by 15 min slots. After 
all, if health becomes a commodity to be bought and 
sold, is it any wonder that friendship should likewise 
become a commodity? And if social relations and 
friendship become things, like this, it is equally unsur- 
prising that the subject becomes object to him or her- 
self so that 
the patients find it very rewarding to improve their own 
baseline. This perhaps is the most meaningful reward of all. 
Improving one’s baseline indicates to the patient that he is 
essentially competing against himself. He views himself as 
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the one controlling his own behavior. This eliminates the 
need for increased interaction when the behavior is unac- 
ceptable. In other words, the patient graphically knows his 
behavior is unacceptable and we as professionals are free 
to “ignore” the unacceptable behavior [14]. 
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE NATIVE’S 
POINT OF VIEW 
If contracting represents the intrusion of one 
dimension of the social sciences, Behaviorism, into 
medical practice so as to improve and humanize 
medical care, then Anthropology too has something 
to add; namely a concern with the native’s point of 
view. The idea here, as put forward by Kleinman et a[. 
[16] in a recent article in the presitigious Annals of 
Inter& Medicine, is that disease and illness represent 
two different realities and that illness is shaped by 
culture. Disease represents organ dysfunction which 
can be modified by the pathologist and measured in 
the laboratory, while illness is what that dysfunction 
means to the person suffering it. Cirrhosis of the liver, 
for instance, can be represented in “disease” terms; by 
the micropathologist in terms of the architectural dis- 
tortion of tissue and cellular morphology, by the bio- 
chemist in terms of changes in enzyme levels, and so 
on. But to the person afflicted with the “disease”, it 
means something else and this something else is the 
“illness” dimension; the cultural significance of the 
term “cirrhosis,” the meanings read into the discom- 
forts, symptoms, signs, and treatment of the “disease”, 
and so on. This is the native’s point of view and it will 
of necessity differ from the doctor’s “disease” view- 
point. Stemming from their reading of Anthropology 
and from their own experience with folk medicine in 
Third World cultures, Kleinman ef al. hold this differ- 
ence between “disease” and “illness” to be of great 
importance. They advocate an addition to the train- 
ing of medical personnel so that they too will become 
aware of this difference and act on it. This they call 
“clinical social science” and its focus shall be with the 
“cultural construction of clinical reality”. Learning 
and applying this shall improve doctor-patient rela- 
tionships and the efficacy of therapy, overcoming the 
communication gap between the “doctor’s model of 
disease” and the “patient’s model of illness”. As with 
contracting, non-compliance and the management of 
human beings is of prime concern. 
Training modern health professionals to treat both disease 
and illness routinely and to uncover discrepant views of 
clinical reality will result in measurable improvement in 
management and compliance, patient satisfaction, and 
treatment outcomes I: 161. 
Elucidation of the patient’s model of illness will aid 
the clinician in dealing with conflict between their 
respective beliefs and values. The clinician’s task is to 
educate the patient if the latter’s model interferes with 
appropriate care. Education by the clinician is seen as 
a process of “negotiating” the different cognitive and 
value orientations, and such negotiation “may well be 
the single most important step in engaging the 
patient’s trust” (Kleinman et al. [17]). Like so much 
of the humanistic reform-mongering propounded in 
recent times, in which a concern with the natives’ 
point of view comes to the fore, there lurks the danger 
that the experts will avail themselves of that knowl- 
edge only to make the science of human management 
all the more powerful and coercive. For indeed there 
will be irreconcilable conflicts of interest and these 
will be “negotiated” by those who hold the upper 
hand, albeit in terms of a language and a practice 
which denies such manipulation and the existence of 
unequal control. The old language and practice which 
left important assumptions unsaid and relied on an 
implicit set of understandings conveyed in a relation- 
ship of trust is to be transformed. The relationship is 
now seen in terms of a “provider” and a “client”. both 
“allies” in a situation of mutual concern. Kleinman et 
al. demonstrate this democratic universe in which far 
from cleaning up the old-fashioned mystifications as 
embodied in trust relationships, new mystifications 
are put in their place which are equally if not more 
disturbing. With their scheme the clinician 
mediates between different cognitive and value orien- 
tations. He actively negotiates with the patient as a thera- 
peutic ally. For example, if the patient accepts the use of 
antibiotics but believes that the burning of incense or the 
wearing of an amulet or a consultation with a fortune-teller 
is also needed, the physician must understand this belief 
but need not attempt to change it. If. however. the patient 
regards penicillin as a “hot” remedy inappropriate for a 
“hot” disease.and is therefore unwilling to take it. one can 
negotiate ways to “neutralize” penicillin or one must 
attempt to persuade the patient of the incorrectness of his 
belief, a most difficult task [17]. 
.It is a strange “alliance” in which one party avails 
itself of the other’s private understandings in order to 
manipulate them all the more successfully. What pos- 
sibility is there in this sort of alliance for the patient 
to explore the doctor’s private model of both disease 
and illness, and negotiate that? Restricted by the 
necessity to perpetuate professionalism and the iron- 
clad distinction between clinician and patient, while 
at the same time exhorting the need and advantage of 
taking cultural awareness into account. these authors 
fail to see that it is not the “cultural construction of 
clinical reality” that needs dragging into the light of 
day, but instead it is the clinical construction of 
reality that is at issue. 
THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
CLINICAL REALITY, OR THE 
CLINICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE? 
This is where sensitive anthropological understand- 
ing truly sheds light. The doctors and the “health care 
providers” are no less immune to the social construc- 
tion of reality than the patients they minister, and the 
reality of concern is as much defined by power and 
control as by colorful symbols of culture, incense, 
amulets, fortune-telling, hot-and-cold, and so forth. 
What is significant is that at this stage of medicine 
and the crises afflicting it, such a project should 
emerge. What is happening is that for the first time in 
the modern clinical situation, an attempt is underway 
to make explicit what was previously implicit, but 
that this archaeology of the implicit cannot escape the 
demands for professional control. The patient’s so- 
called model of illness differs most significantly from 
the clinician’s not in terms of exotic symbolization 
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the complacent and everyday acceptance of conven- 
tional structures of meaning. The doctor and the 
patient come together in the clinic. No longer can the 
community watch them and share in this work. 
Nevertheless, whether the patient wants to accept 
penicillin or not, whether the rest of us are physically 
present in the clinic or not, the doctor and the 
patient are curing the threat posed to convention and 
to society, tranquilizing the disturbance that sickness 
unleashes against normal thought which is not a sta- 
tic system but a system waxing, consolidating and 
dissolving on the reefs of its contradictions. It is not 
the cultural construction of clinical reality that is here 
at issue, but the clinical construction and reconstruc- 
tion of a commoditized reality that is at stake. Until 
that is recognize& and acted upon, humanistic medi- 
cine is a contradiction of terms [20]. 
but in terms of the anxiety to locate the social and 
moral meaning of the disease. The clinician cannot 
allow this anxiety to gain either legitimacy or to in- 
clude ever-widening spheres of social relationships. in- 
cluding that of the hospital and the clinician. for more 
often than not once this process of thought is given its 
head it may well condemn as much as accept the 
contemporary constitution of social relationships 
and society itself. 
Attempts such as those advocated by Kleinman et 
al. to make explicit what was previously implicit, 
merely seize on the implicit with the instruments of 
modern social science so to all the better control it. 
Yet in doing so they unwittingly reveal all the more 
clearly the bare bones of what really goes on in an 
apparently technical clinical encounter by way of 
manipulation and mediation of contradictions in 
society. 
The immediate impulse for this archaeology of the 
implicit, this dragging into consciousness what was 
previously left unsaid or unconscious in medical prac- 
tice, comes at a time when the issue of the so-called 
non-compliant patient (like the illiterate schoolchild) 
is alarming the medical establishment, now concerned 
as never before with the rationalization of the health 
assembly-line and with rising costs. In this regard, it is 
a scandal and also self-defeating to appeal to Anthro- 
pology for evidence as to the power of concepts like 
the “patient’s model” and the difference between the 
“how” and the “why” of “disease” and “illness”. For 
the medical anthropology of so-called “primitive” 
societies also teaches us that medicine is pre- 
eminently an instrument of social control. It teaches 
us that the “why” or “illness” dimension of sickness 
bears precisely on what makes life meaningful and 
worthwhile, compelling one to examine the social and 
moral causes of sickness, and that those causes lie in 
communal and reciprocal inter-human considerations 
which are antithetical to the bases of modern social 
organization patterned on the necessities of capitalist 
and bureaucratic prerogatives. As Victor Turner con- 
cludes in his discussion of the Ndembu doctor in 
rural Zambia: 
It seems that the Ndembu “doctor” sees his task less as 
curing an individual patient than as remedying the ills of a 
corporate group. The sickness of the patient is mainly a 
sign that “something is rotten” in the corporate body. The 
patient will not get better until all the tensions and aggres- 
sions in the groups interrelations have been brought to 
light and exposed to ritual treatment.. The doctor’s task 
is to tap the various streams of affect associated with these 
conflicts and with the social and interpersonal disputes in 
which they are manifested, and to channel them in a 
socially positive direction. The raw energies of conflict are 
thus domesticated in the service of the traditional social 
order [IS]. 
And Lkvi-Strauss reminds us in his essay, “The Sor- 
cerer and His Magic”. that the rites of healing rea- 
dapts society to predefined problems through the 
‘medium of the patient; that this process rejuvenates 
and even elaborates the society’s essential axioms 
[19]. Charged with the emotional load of suffering 
and of abnormality, sickness sets forth a challenge to 
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